Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf buzzed with activity as jeeps rumbled across the dry desert sand and helicopters patrolled the skies above. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait had destabilized the Middle East, prompting American President George Bush to pledge a restoration of the status quo. In just one week, the United States military dismantled the fourth largest army in the world, achieving this remarkable feat with surprisingly few casualties. The success of the Gulf War was rooted in the lessons of leadership learned from the Vietnam War. Prominent generals like Norman Schwarzkopf, Barry McCaffrey, and Colin Powell drew on their experiences as young officers in Vietnam to drive transformative changes within the military, courageously paving the way for victory in the Gulf. These influential leaders tackled critical issues in war management, including training and recruitment, civil-military relations, and objective planning—areas that had once posed significant challenges for American forces in Southeast Asia. Their ability to learn and adapt transformed the United States military into the formidable fighting force it became during the Gulf War. Many World War II veterans can vividly recall the rigorous training they underwent to serve in the Army. For years, America prepared its troops through a demanding regimen of exercise, inspections, obstacle courses, and marksmanship. Most military leaders agreed that this approach was essential for building strong, disciplined young men who could be relied upon in any situation. However, one significant drawback of this system was the limited follow-up training necessary for success in complex, specialized missions. It was generally understood that after completing initial training and a few specialized classes in their fields, recruits would gain sufficient experience in the theater of operations. Consequently, many troops entered combat unprepared for what lay ahead, finding themselves inadequately trained for their tasks and missions. As for Army officers—aside from those from West Point—most were college graduates who received only a few weeks of leadership courses before being placed in command with minimal practical knowledge. In contrast to the wave of volunteers during World War II, the Vietnam War quickly became unpopular and relied on the draft to meet the escalating troop demands. For those of average means, it was relatively easy to avoid military service by enrolling in a university or exploiting loopholes in the system. Consequently, many poorer young men, who lacked adequate education or technical skills, found themselves ensnared by the draft. Once they entered basic training, the military felt compelled to train these soldiers in the same manner as their WWII predecessors, emphasizing discipline and obedience. Often, the treatment they received was excessively harsh, and the intent behind it was questionable. However, the urgent demand for troops in Vietnam led the military to deploy men without a clear strategy for leadership or how to utilize their skills effectively in the field. While WWII marked a significant victory for the United States in terms of tactics and planning, it was largely fought on a conventional level, with battles typically revolving around one side trying to overpower the other through superior firepower and strategy. Most battles featured tanks, air power, naval vessels, and advanced artillery, alongside large numbers of troops. Generally, armies were aware of each other's positions, and the primary objective was to dismantle the enemy's defenses. While World War II was marked by significant bloodshed and danger, its conventional nature meant that American tactics from earlier conflicts remained relevant. However, as the war in Vietnam escalated, it became clear that this conflict was unlike any large-scale war the United States had faced before. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Vietcong often found themselves at a severe disadvantage in terms of firepower, technology, training, and experience. Yet, the U.S. underestimated the determination and resolve of these fighters and failed to anticipate the intense public backlash against the war. While the Vietcong lost nearly every battle and suffered heavy casualties, they continually found ways to sustain their fight. The United States was unprepared for the fierce determination of an enemy defending their homeland and their survival. In addition to underestimating the Vietcong, the U.S. failed to adapt its tactics and policies from World War II. When America entered the Vietnam conflict, many of the generals had served as young lieutenants in WWII. Accustomed to conventional warfare, they were largely blind to the fact that the Vietnamese would engage in a very different and unconventional style of combat. There were few significant North Vietnamese Army units capable of facing a superpower in direct confrontation (after the Battle of Ia Drang, the NVA struggled to conduct missions), and identifying the enemy became increasingly complex. Any individual could potentially be a combatant, making it challenging to distinguish between friend and foe when rounded up. Combatants in the Vietnam War were no longer easily identifiable by their uniforms. The Vietcong often employed women and children to approach American soldiers and detonate explosives. While the generals aimed to leverage superior firepower to eliminate the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), they failed to understand that a war of attrition and stagnation is unwinnable. General Westmoreland embraced this strategy, focusing on killing more NVA soldiers than Americans lost. In theory, the overwhelming might of the American military would eventually cripple the Vietcong and NVA’s capacity to wage war, but this would take years, if not decades, to achieve. The American forces found themselves in a foreign land—both physically and ideologically—fighting without clear objectives. Back home, the American public anticipated a swift victory with minimal casualties and a rapid end to the spread of communism. Although support surged following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, enthusiasm quickly faded, giving way to violent backlash. A military lacking public support, unclear reasons for remaining in a conflict that many felt "wasn't theirs," and low morale could not prevail against a resilient and determined enemy. During the Vietnam War, the air power component was arguably the most impacted by micromanagement within the military. Bombing strikes and close air support frequently missed their marks, all while a seemingly contradictory policy prevailed. It was permissible to carpet bomb cities and villages, yet essential military targets—such as SAM sites and NVA encampments—required specific approval from civilian officials. This created a significant challenge: fighting an insurgent-style war while constraining the military's operational capabilities proved nearly impossible. Despite serious shortcomings in training and planning, the management of the Vietnam conflict emerged as a critical limitation on America's military effectiveness. Images circulated widely, particularly among military personnel, depicting civilians in well-appointed offices in Washington, planning air attacks without a single uniformed officer present for consultation. Even in the most crucial meetings regarding the war, the opinions of generals were often overlooked. When they proposed tactics and maneuvers that could potentially lead to victory, their civilian counterparts frequently dismissed these suggestions, fearing that such actions might provoke intervention from China or Russia. Planners deliberately avoided targeting SAM sites and NVA encampments due to concerns about potential Chinese or Russian casualties nearby. Lt. Gen. Charles Horner recounted how, as a lieutenant, he received specific objectives but was restricted to actions explicitly outlined for him. Many Chinese and Russian attaches were covertly assigned to North Vietnamese air defense missile sites, which were scattered throughout the North Vietnamese countryside. American pilots were given strict orders not to engage these sites, fearing secondary casualties. As a result, these targets became virtually invulnerable, leading to the downing of numerous American planes. Instead of neutralizing the SAMs, Washington policymakers opted to plan missions around the North Vietnamese defenses, a perilous strategy that overlooked the realities faced by pilots. Furthermore, pilots were often prohibited from making quick decisions that could potentially save hundreds of lives. Instead of immediately targeting enemy encampments and defense sites, pilots were required to report the situation up the chain of command for permission to strike. Each attack needed approval not only from military leaders but also from several civilian analysts who had to sanction the target. By the time an order was finally issued to destroy the encampment—often resulting in a denial—days or even weeks had passed, rendering the site obsolete. This attempt to wage war with vague objectives, compounded by bureaucratic delays, contributed to America's failure in the Vietnam War. In his book The War Managers, Douglas Kinnard surveyed many of the generals involved in the conflict. His findings revealed a significant communication gap between civilian and military leadership. Seventy percent of military leaders expressed uncertainty about their objectives and responsibilities, while nearly ninety percent felt that those in lower ranks were simply engaged in “day-to-day” operations. The civilian leadership's failure to clearly communicate their goals left many generals frustrated, tasked with fighting a war devoid of clear objectives. The helicopter, virtually unknown during World War II, completed 36 million sorties and became the primary means of transporting troops once in the theater. However, as helicopters evolved into essential tools for transport and battle management, a widening gap emerged between civilian and military leadership, as well as among ground units themselves. Throughout history, generals directed battles from elevated positions or alongside their troops on the front lines. They earned respect by fighting alongside their men, especially when soldiers witnessed their leaders facing the same dangers. In Vietnam, technology played an increasingly significant role in planning and coordinating battles. With helicopters capable of flying above the combat zone and providing a comprehensive view of both sides, military leaders could direct operations from a distance, often without facing real danger. While the helicopter enhanced efficiency and equipped ground commanders with a technological "eye in the sky" to track enemy movements, it also introduced several trade-offs. Generally speaking, a general positioned near the front lines typically granted his officers the autonomy to make judgment calls in wartime conditions. However, in a helicopter, generals often took it upon themselves to make those decisions for ground commanders, which undermined their authority and led to a tendency toward micromanagement. While a single decision by a general or colonel might initially benefit the ground commander, over time, many officers began to lose faith in their ability to lead. This erosion of trust trickled down through the ranks, resulting in a near absence of effective leadership in several units. On the other hand, helicopters provided a much safer environment for high-ranking officers. During World War II, 77 colonels were killed in combat, whereas in Vietnam, only 8 met the same fate. The stark contrast—one colonel casualty for every 2,206 soldiers in WWII compared to one for every 3,407 in Vietnam—highlights the significant shift in leadership dynamics between the two conflicts. As the Vietnam War slowly came to a close and troops returned home, society remained apprehensive about the draft. As a result, Richard Nixon announced in 1973 that the military would transition to an all-volunteer force, effectively abolishing the draft. Commanders were thrown into a state of panic upon hearing this news. The military had become unpopular, particularly after the Vietnam War, and few people were eager to embrace the demanding and perilous lifestyle it entailed. Compounding the issue, the Army was reducing its size from 1.6 million to 800,000 personnel, alongside significant budget cuts. There seemed to be no clear path to preserving the military's prestige, especially in the eyes of generals trained in the "old army." Many World War II veterans were resistant to changing their views on training and were unwilling to transform the military into a less demanding institution just to maintain adequate personnel levels. In contrast, younger officers recognized the urgent need for reform, even if it meant abandoning centuries-old traditions and practices. The Vietnam War had laid bare the shortcomings of many military strategies, presenting America with a crucial opportunity to adapt to the evolving nature of warfare. Faced with the challenge of addressing the military’s pressing recruitment issues, Lt. General William Forsyth assembled a team of young officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) tasked with exploring how the military could adapt to the end of the draft and promote service as a respectable and honorable career. Although Gen. Forsyth had served in World War II and Korea, he viewed this initiative as an opportunity to reform the military. He observed significant gaps in leadership, particularly in the relationships between officers and NCOs, as well as among junior and senior officers. In his perspective, officers often erected an authoritarian barrier that stifled interaction among soldiers and impeded effective leadership. He also believed that the military placed excessive emphasis on regulations and punishment, rather than focusing adequately on training for tactical operations. One of the most influential works in the military's transformation was Leadership for the 1970s, authored by Lieutenant Colonels Walt Ulmer and Mike Malone during their studies at the Army War College. Both men collaborated closely with Gen. Forsyth on this pivotal project. Forsyth sought to understand how the military operated and advocated for significant changes to the status quo. He argued that, with the draft no longer a viable means of recruiting troops, it was the military's responsibility to provide its personnel with the encouragement and dignity that every human being deserves. To accomplish this, the outdated system of harsh discipline and relentless inspections needed to be dismantled. This initiative, known as the Volar experiment, aimed to transform the overall military lifestyle. Rather than employing a "cookie cutter" approach that offered uniform training for all, the experiment focused on the necessity of specialized training over mere discipline. Each soldier must have a clear role in any operation, and they must understand that role without hesitation or uncertainty. For instance, a Forward Air Controller should receive broad training to grasp the overall conduct of operations, but the majority of their time should be dedicated to honing their specialty and collaborating with other units to ensure seamless integration. In theory, mission planning should gradually become an integral part of a soldier's career, building on their specific skills and experiences. Furthermore, Leadership for the 1970s emphasized that without the draft, soldiers deserved to be treated with respect and civility. While discipline would still be enforced to maintain standards, unnecessary punishment would be avoided. Instead of Saturday morning inspections, 12-hour workdays, open barracks, 5 AM reveille, and weekend bed checks, the focus shifted to a more civilian atmosphere: free weekends, 8-hour workdays, personal privacy, councils to address grievances, increased pay, and improved food quality (including beer vending machines).[^24] The campaign slogan “The Army Wants to Join You” marked a departure from the old perception that once you joined the Army, it owned you.[^25] The elimination of the draft necessitated a reevaluation of outdated policies to maintain stable personnel levels. Eight bases were the first to adopt the principles of the Volar experiment, aiming to boost morale and recruitment. Each participating base experienced a reduction in AWOL incidents and general crime, alongside an increase in morale and enlistment. The training became more rigorous yet specialized, with commanders receiving valuable feedback on their leadership and how they were perceived by their subordinates. Counseling sessions became increasingly common, allowing issues to be addressed early on rather than allowing them to fester into crises. At each base involved in the experiment, commanders observed a significant improvement in the quality of their personnel. Unfortunately, the experiment was ultimately shut down by generals and retired veterans who had been trained under the old system. Many were reluctant to accept the findings and reports from the initiative, believing that the Volar experiment made military life too comfortable. However, over the following years, the principles of the experiment gradually resurfaced, as a new generation of officers recognized the importance of treating their subordinates with respect and care. Not only did the Volar experiment enable the military to thrive amid budget cuts and the end of the draft, but it also established a precedent that contributed to the military's success during the Gulf War. As reliance on technology grew, an increasing number of leaders shifted from traditional leadership roles to strategic planning. Counseling, motivating, and inspiring troops often took a backseat to the use of technology. However, the professionalization of the military in the 1970s and '80s highlighted the need for a return to inspirational leadership. Officers in Vietnam frequently relied on the seemingly endless supply of personnel, but with the end of the draft, it became clear that they needed to focus on developing individuals rather than treating them as mere statistics. To avoid the "helicopter leadership" characteristic of the Vietnam War, Gulf War planners leveraged technology to provide ground commanders with as much information as possible and to relay the most current updates. The mission planning phase evolved into a more scientific and calculated process, incorporating input from commanders across various branches. For example, Norman Schwarzkopf and his team spent several months collaborating with civilian leadership to strategize the invasion of Iraq. Once the plan was finalized and communicated to the appropriate commanders, it became their responsibility to execute the mission. Ground commanders, equipped with all the necessary information, were the ones making critical decisions in the heat of the moment, not the civilian leadership. In the years between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, both military and civilian leaders gained valuable insights into the complexities of managing warfare. While civilian leadership can provide crucial perspectives on overall strategies, it is ultimately the military's duty to execute missions without unnecessary interference. The lessons learned from Vietnam fostered a more collaborative relationship between civilian and military leaders during the Gulf War. Although the management of the Vietnam conflict was lacking, the experiences gained were deeply ingrained in the young lieutenants who would later rise to the rank of general in the Gulf War. They understood that in any future conflict, it was essential to reclaim a degree of leadership rather than simply following orders from Washington without question. This lesson was not lost on politicians, either. Throughout the remainder of the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s, presidents recognized the importance of trusting the military rather than attempting to control every action. Congress members who had served in the Vietnam War and understood the frustrations of mismanagement supported these changes, advocating for a well-trained and professional military to restore faith among the American public and civilian leadership. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, America was prepared for war. President Bush understood the implications of making every military decision himself, so he delegated nearly all control to the military. While there was significant involvement from civilian military advisors regarding military objectives and overall battle plans, this relationship often proved beneficial. For instance, one of General Colin Powell’s aides noted that although Gen. Powell and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney were often locked in heated debates, which Powell described as "extremely healthy." He noted, “Cheney always wanted to act immediately. He didn’t always grasp the enormity of the buildup. However, we likely wouldn’t have been as prepared as we were without Cheney’s insistence.” It’s clear that management practices following the Vietnam War quickly evolved to grant military leaders greater autonomy, resulting in a more professional military that could be trusted by civilian leadership. Had it not been for the lessons learned from Vietnam, the Gulf War might have unfolded quite differently. The Vietnam War's failure, despite America's superpower status, stemmed from several factors: an inability to adapt military training to the evolving nature of warfare, a lack of clear objectives, and pervasive bureaucracy. These elements contributed significantly to the bitter defeat the United States faced. While the casualties and missteps of the Vietnam War were undeniably tragic, the lessons learned from that conflict enabled the U.S. military to evolve into the effective force it is today. The success of the Gulf War can be directly linked to the failures experienced in Vietnam, and the sacrifices made during that time ultimately saved lives two decades later in the Arabian Gulf.